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Although extensive research has documented the effectiveness of common or dual in-groups on improving intergroup relations,
little is known about how individual-difference variables affect people’s willingness to make such re-categorizations in the ﬁrst
place. Here, we demonstrate that individual differences in religious fundamentalism predict willingness to categorize in terms of
the common Abrahamic religious origins of Christianity and Islam among Christians and Muslims. Study 1 (n= 243 Christians,
291 Muslims) uses multigroup structural equation modeling and Study 2 (n=80 Christians) an experimental manipulation to show
that religious fundamentalism causes lower dual Abrahamic categorization, which, in turn, predicts more positive attitudes toward
the respective out-group, mediating the negative effects of religious fundamentalism on religious intergroup bias. While making the
general case that individual differences may play important roles for dual categorizations, these results also highlight the speciﬁc
positive potential of dual ecumenical categorizations for improving interreligious relations. Research and societal implications
are discussed. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Fundamentalism as it is called is not conﬁned to the Muslim
world. It is something that we have seen in different parts of
the world. Let us hope that a dialogue between the followers
of the three great monotheistic religions could help in putting
an end to this.
King Hussein I, 1999
Throughout history, humans have justiﬁed the derogation,
discrimination or even persecution of members of faiths other
than their own, often on the basis of minuscule theological dif-
ferences (Gort & Vroom, 2002). And also in contemporary
Western Europe, the climate toward religious minority groups
tends to be tense. About 14 million Muslims presently live in
Western Europe as a result of labor migration in the aftermath
of World War 2 (Maréchal, 2002), and countries that were
relatively homogeneous in terms of religious beliefs have
become multireligious over the last few decades. This profound
change has not been embraced by everyone. In particular, since
the terror attacks of 9/11, religion has resurged as a salient
social marker in the discourse on intercultural relations in the
West (Poynting & Mason, 2007; Strabac & Listhaug, 2008),
and reports have documented a rise in negative attitudes toward
Muslims and Islam (see, e.g., EUMC, 2005; EUMC, 2006;
Kunst, Sam, & Ulleberg, 2013).
The public discourse in many western European countries has
been inordinately preoccupied with what distinguishes Muslims*Correspondence to: Jonas R. Kunst, Department of Psychology, University of O
E-mail: j.r.kunst@psykologi.uio.no
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.and Christians (Fekete, 2004; Zelizer & Allan, 2002), focusing
on “insurmountable cultural differences” (Kunst, Tajamal,
Sam, & Ulleberg, 2012, p. 519) and, arguably, on Muslims as
“Islamic fundamentalists.” Yet, from a theological perspective,
Islam and Christianity share several communalities, and scrip-
tures and central religious ﬁgures emphasize this common
origin. Because both Islam and Christianity trace their origins
to the common progenitor Abraham/Ibrahim, Muslims as well
as Christians believe in an Abrahamic religion, and a number
of other religious ﬁgures, such as Noah/Nuh, Adam, Moses/
Musa, Jona/Yunus and Jesus/Issa, are central in both religions.
Indeed, there is a certain theological awareness and acknowledg-
ment of a common ecumenical Abrahamic group in both
religions (Boase, 2005). For instance, the Surat Al-Baqarah of
the Qur’an states:
Surely those who believe, and those who are Jews, and the
Christians, and the Sabians, whoever believes in Allah and
the last day and does good, they shall have their reward
from their Lord, and there is no fear for them, nor shall they
grieve (Qur’an, 2:62; also see Qur’an, 5:69).
In a similar vein, the deceased pope Paul VI stated:
The church regards with esteem also the Moslems. They
adore the one God, living and subsisting in Himself (…)
and take pains to submit wholeheartedly to even Hisslo, Postboks 1094 Blindern, 0317 Oslo, Norway.
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Jonas R. Kunst et al.inscrutable decrees, just as Abraham, with whom the faith
of Islam takes pleasure in linking itself, submitted to God
(Pope Paul VI, 1965).
Unfortunately, little attention has been paid to these striking
theological communalities between Christianity and Islam,
although they may positively improve intergroup relations
between Christian and Muslim citizens—one of the most
pressing social issues in contemporary Europe: Because be-
longing to a group promotes intergroup bias (Tajfel, 1970;
Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971), it should be the case
that when “members of different groups are induced to conceive
of themselves as a single group rather than two completely
separate groups, attitudes toward former out-groupmembers will
become more positive through processes involving pro-ingroup
bias” (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993,
p. 6). A series of experiments (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000;
Gaertner, Dovidio, & Bachman, 1996; Gaertner et al., 1993)
and correlational research (see Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000,
2005) support this common in-group identity model (CIIM;
Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) to great extent. In some studies,
however, efforts to establish a new, common in-group identity
have led to more out-group bias (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000; also
see Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2007). Possibly, this is because
high identiﬁers can experience the establishment of an inclusive
common group as a threat to their subgroup identity (Dovidio
et al., 2007). In the present case, such identity threat would likely
result from asking Muslims or Christians, who identify strongly
with their religious faiths, to no longer identify as Muslims or
Christians, but instead as “Abrahamics.” Instead, it should be
more beneﬁcial to establish dual categorizations that allow
individuals to maintain pronounced subgroup identities within
an overarching common group (Dovidio et al., 2007)—as
“Muslim-Abrahamics” and “Christian-Abrahamics,” so to speak.
Indeed, such dual categorizations generally appear to reduce
out-group bias to similar, or even better, degrees than common
group categorizations (Eller & Abrams, 2004).
Here, we investigate whether dual categorizations, including
both the Abrahamic and Christian/Muslim identities, reduce bias
toward the respective Abrahamic out-group and whether
religious fundamentalism affects their willingness to consider
these common religious origins in the ﬁrst place. Speciﬁcally,
we expect that religious fundamentalism will cause lower dual
Abrahamic categorization, which, in turn, should mediate the
negative effects of religious fundamentalism on interreligious bias.RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AS NEGATIVE
PREDICTOR OF DUAL CATEGORIZATION AMONG
RELIGIOUS GROUPSAlthough there may be strong theological ground for catego-
rizing related religions into supra-ecumenical groups, at the
individual level, believers may strongly differ in the degree
to which they endorse such dual groups. Despite extensive
research on the CIIM, it has seldom been investigated in light
of individual-difference variables that are consistent predictors
of prejudice, such as social dominance orientation (Sidanius &
Pratto, 1999), right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1988)
or—central in the present study—religious fundamentalismCopyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.(Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992, 2004). Although a few
studies have shown that social dominance orientation moderates
the relation between common in-group categorizations and out-
group bias (Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001; Esses,
Wagner, Wolf, Preiser, & Wilbur, 2006; also see Thomsen,
Green, & Sidanius, 2008), it remains unclear if and how individ-
ual-difference variables cause individuals to differentially endorse
dual group categorizations in the ﬁrst place. Here, we argue that
religious fundamentalism should negatively affect believers’will-
ingness to categorize in terms of dual religious groups.
Religious fundamentalism can be deﬁned as “the belief that
there is one set of religious teachings that clearly contains the
fundamental, basic intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about
humanity and deity” (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992, p. 118).
Capturing this, Altemeyer and Hunsberger found their religious
fundamentalism scale to predict prejudice and right-wing
authoritarianism so strongly that they speculated that religious
fundamentalism may simply constitute a speciﬁc expression of
right-wing authoritarianism in the religious domain. Yet, studies
have shown that, although both constructs are highly related, they
account for unique variance in prejudice (Laythe, Finkel, Bringle,
& Kirkpatrick, 2002; Laythe, Finkel, & Kirkpatrick, 2001).
Fundamentalists differ from their peers who score low on reli-
gious fundamentalism inmanyways. They have less doubts about
their own religious belief and are less tolerant toward religious
disagreement (Wrench, Corrigan, McCroskey, & Punyanunt-Car-
ter, 2006) and are more concerned about other people not living
up to their religious standards than peers low on religious funda-
mentalism (Hunsberger, Alisat, Pancer, & Pratt, 1996). They also
tend to be more negative toward women (see, e.g., Blogowska &
Saroglou, 2011; Hunsberger, Owusu, & Duck, 1999), homosex-
uals (see Whitley, 2009 for a meta-analysis) and ethnic (Hall,
Matz, &Wood, 2010) and religious out-groups (Johnson, Rowatt,
& LaBouff, 2012; Rowatt, Franklin, & Cotton, 2005). Although
this religious fundamentalism–prejudice link is empirically well
established, so far research exploring its underlying processes
has only focused on various cognitive styles. However, because
religious fundamentalism is also a central theme of the public dis-
course on interreligious group relations in the West, core
intergroup processes should also play important roles for its en-
dorsement. In particular, the very cognitive styles that character-
ize religious fundamentalists should also make them less inclined
to endorse dual religious groups, which, in turn, will have subse-
quent negative impact on intergroup relations, mediating the fun-
damentalism–prejudice link.
For religious fundamentalists, who tend to take holy scriptures
literally and as the ﬁnite truth, religion provides a clear-cut and plain
view on life and thereby “a sense of coherence in an otherwise
chaotic world” (Hood, Hill, & Williamson, 2005, pp. 17–18). This
notion is supported by the fact that religious fundamentalists have
been found to have a less complex understanding of religious issues
than individuals low in religious fundamentalism (Pancer, Jackson,
Hunsberger, Pratt, & Lea, 1995). Consequently, Christian or
Muslim fundamentalists may pay little attention to, ignore or
even reject complex intertwined theological relations between
Christianity and Islam and consequently express low endorse-
ment of a dual Abrahamic group.
Similarly, their close-minded world view (Hunsberger &
Jackson, 2005) makes fundamentalists vehemently reject
alternative ways to see the world (Brandt & Reyna, 2010;Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. (2014)
Late Abrahamic reunionWrench et al., 2006). In fact, the out-group derogation typical
of religious fundamentalists may function precisely to protect
their world views (Brandt & Reyna, 2010). As Hood et al.
(2005) state, “for fundamentalists, there is but one true avenue
for ﬁnding meaning” (p. 30) and that involves exclusively fol-
lowing their own speciﬁc religion, which is seen as the one
and only path to salvation. Their religion, in turn, provides
answer to anxiety-eliciting questions such as those related to one’s
own mortality (Friedman & Rholes, 2008; Vail et al., 2010).
Acknowledging that one’s own religion is related to other
religions or even partly is based on the same theological ground,
however, can be seen as relativizing the absoluteness and infalli-
bility of one’s own religious meaning system. Hence, for fundamen-
talistMuslims orChristians, endorsing common originswith another
Abrahamic group that interprets the same religio-historical events,
for instance, the role of Jesus, in a different manner may shake the
very fundament of their meaning system that provided ultimate
certainty. Consequently, Christian and Muslim religious fundamen-
talists should reject dual categorizations insofar as it constitutes a
threat to their fundamentalist, rigid and preclusive conceptions.
Lastly, and importantly, religious fundamentalists identify
strongly with their religious group (Shaffer & Hastings, 2007) and
so may arguably perceive categorizing themselves into a dual
religious group as an identity threat (Dovidio et al., 2007). For
fundamentalists, belonging to their speciﬁc religion and religious
group constitutes a central part of their self-concept, which may have
been emphasized from the beginning of their lives (Altemeyer, 2003).
Blurring these group boundaries by acknowledging dual or common
groupmembership togetherwith a related religionmay again threaten
individuals’ self-concepts. Thus, to maintain their clear group
distinctions between “them” and “us,” Christian and Muslim funda-
mentalists should likely reject any type of dual Abrahamic group.Overview of the Studies
In the two studies reported here, we empirically test whether
1. religious fundamentalism negatively predicts dual Abrahamic
group categorization andReligious  
Fundamentalism 
Religious 
Identity 
Dual Abrahamic
Categorization 
-
+
+
-
Figure 1. Hypothesized relations
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.2. dual Abrahamic categorization is related to less out-group
bias, mediating the effect of religious fundamentalism on
out-group bias (Figure 1).
Both studies were conducted in Germany, because religion
in Germany constitutes a salient social marker and because
interreligious tensions between Muslims and Christians in
Germany can be described as tense (Kunst et al., 2012; Kunst
et al., 2013). More than two thirds of the German population is
Christian, and in contrast to other West-European countries,
there is no juridical division between the Church and the State.
Hence, compared with European countries practicing the
principle of Laïcité, such as France, Christian religious
education is taught in schools, and large-scale political parties
are declared Christian.
In Study 1, we test our mediation prediction using a
multigroup structural equation model with Christians and
Muslims. Here, we also control for religious identity as it has
been found to be highly correlated with religious fundamental-
ism in earlier research (Shaffer & Hastings, 2007) and because
it may also predict individuals’ willingness to endorse com-
mon or dual groups (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Hence, con-
trolling for religious identity allows us to assess the unique
predictive role of religious fundamentalism. In Study 2, we
use an experimental saliency manipulation to conﬁrm that reli-
gious fundamentalism causes dual Abrahamic categorization
and, once again, using a structural equation model, test the
mediation model proposed—this time with causal data.STUDY 1This ﬁrst study tests our proposed model with data obtained
from a sample of Christians and Muslims. In terms of group
bias, we distinguish between affective and cognitive aspects
of out-group bias, as has been suggested in earlier studies
(Stangor, Sullivan, & Ford, 1991; Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005),
to gain a more comprehensive insight into the broadband of
the effects of dual Abrahamic categorization. Given thatNegative Out-Group
Emotions 
Positive Out-Group 
Emotions 
Negative Out-Group
Stereotypes 
Positive Out-Group 
Stereotypes 
-
+
-
+
+
-
-
-
-
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Jonas R. Kunst et al.subgroup identiﬁcation in earlier research has negatively
predicted common or dual group categorization (Gaertner &
Dovidio, 2000), we control for the latter variable in the
model. Including both religious identity and religious
fundamentalism that have been shown to be highly correlated
in earlier research (Shaffer & Hastings, 2007), but seldom
are considered together, also allows us to assess the
unique effect of the individual-difference variable religious
fundamentalism.
Methods
Participants
In all, 243 professed Christians and 291 professed Muslims
participated in the study. Most participants were young adults,
Mage=23.62, SDage=6.42, and no age differences between the
groups were observed, t(532) = 1.47, p= .143. The samples were
also comparable in terms of gender (Christians: 46.5% women;
Muslims: 51.2% women) and educational status (Christians:
30.3% lower secondary school, 46.1% upper secondary school,
23.9% university degree; Muslims: 38.8% lower secondary
school, 38.8% upper secondary school, 22.3% university de-
gree). All Muslim participants had a Turkish ethnic background.
Of the Christian participants, 68.3% described their ethnic
background as German, followed by 23.6% who indicated a
European state as their cultural heritage country. Among Chris-
tians, 37.4% identiﬁed themselves as Catholics and 36.3% as
Protestants, whereas the Muslim sample primarily consisted of
Sunni Muslims (83.8%).
Procedure and Measures
Participants were recruited through social online networks,
relevant webpages and snowball sampling in November
2012. All respondents were informed that the study dealt with
interreligious issues accompanied by a picture showing a
circle of the symbols representing the biggest world religions.
Moreover, they were informed about the conﬁdentiality and
their right to withdraw from participation. As a ﬁnancial incen-
tive, participants could participate in the drawing of a €50 gift
voucher. At the beginning of the study, participants were
asked whether they were religious or not, and non-religious
individuals were automatically excluded from participation.Table 1. Psychometric properties and structural equivalence for the stu
Scale Items
α
Christians M
1. Fundamentalism 8 .897
2. Religious identity 4 .894
3. Dual Abrahamic categorization 4 .875
4. Negative out-group emotions 4 .926
5. Positive out-group emotions 4 .878
6. Negative out-group stereotypes 5 .824
7. Positive out-group stereotypes 5 .872
Note: Christians n= 243; Muslims n= 291. Constrained CFA: Measurement wei
obtained for both the emotion and stereotype measures.
CFI, comparative ﬁt index; RMSEA, root mean square error of approximation.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Unless stated otherwise, responses were rated on 6-point
Likert-type scales, with endpoints 1 (totally disagree) and 6
(totally agree). All scales showed satisfactory structural
equivalence (Table 1), which is a prerequisite for cross-cultural
research. Valid group comparisons can only be conducted
when equivalence in underlying factor structures of the
measures has been established (Matsumoto & van de Vijver,
2012). Furthermore, reliability was satisfactory for all scales
despite the negative out-group stereotypes scale, which showed
acceptable reliability in the Muslim sample (Table 1).
Religious Identity
An adjusted version of the identity subscale of the Collective
Self-Esteem Scale (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) was used to
measure the participants’ religious identity (Christians: α= .89;
Muslims: α= .85). The measure can be seen as assessing identi-
ﬁcation with one’s religious group from a social identity per-
spective, rather than measuring intrinsic or extrinsic religiosity.
Participants had to indicate their agreement with four items,
namely “Overall, my religion has very little to do with how I feel
about myself” (reversed), “The religion I belong to is an
important reﬂection of who I am,” “The religion I belong to is
unimportant to my sense of what kind of a person I am” (reversed)
and “In general, belonging to my religion is an important part of
my self-image.”
Religious Fundamentalism
We adopted the revised Religious Fundamentalism Scale
developed by Altemeyer and Hunsberger (2004) to measure
the degree to which the participants held fundamental beliefs
about their religion. To increase the applicability of the scale
among both Christians and Muslims, the following adjustments
were made: First, we deleted two items that dealt with the exis-
tence of “Satan,” because the concept was regarded as theologi-
cally too variant. Second, expressions such as “God,” “God’s
religion” and “sacred scripture” were replaced by “God/Allah,”
“Christianity/Islam” and “Bible/Qur’an,” respectively. Accord-
ingly, participants had to indicate their agreement with 10 items,
such as “To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong
to the one, fundamentally true religion.” Exploratory factor
analyses conducted separately for both samples supported a
one-factor solution. To achieve an invariant factor structure thatdy variables
Constrained CFA
uslims CFI RMSEA χ2 p df
.883 .993 .026 56.67 .065 42
.846 1.000 .000 3.85 .697 6
.863 1.000 .009 6.27 .394 6
.906 .981 .055 88.12 .000 34
.847
.642 .964 .039 134.67 .000 75
.796
ghts and structural covariances were constrained. Two-factor structures were
Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. (2014)
Late Abrahamic reunionis necessary in cross-cultural research, we deleted two items (i.e.,
“When you get right down to it, there are basically only two
kinds of people in the world: The Righteous, who will be
rewarded by God; and the rest, who will not” and “There is a
particular set of religious teachings in this world that are so true,
you can’t go any ‘deeper’ because they are the basic, bedrock
message that God has given humanity”) that showed different
loadings across the samples. The resulting scale had an invariant
one-factor structure and good reliability across the samples
(Christians: α= .90; Muslims: α = .88; Table 1).Dual Abrahamic Categorization
Building on the dual identity conceptionalization of Dovidio
et al. (2007), seven items, of which two were reversed worded,
were developed speciﬁcally for this study. The measure
assessed the degree to which the participants considered
Muslims and Christians as belonging to a common group of
Abrahamic religions while also constituting two distinct
religious groups. Accordingly, the items acknowledged the
uniqueness and autonomy of each religious group while also
emphasizing the common Abrahamic in-group. Exploratory
factor analysis yielded a one-factor solution in both samples.
Yet, to achieve structural equivalence across the samples, the
two contrait items (i.e., “Islam and Christianity constitute
totally different religions” and “Muslims and Christians belong
to two groups, which couldn’t be more different”) and one
protrait item (i.e., “Although Christians and Muslims belong
to different religions, they are united in their belief in God”)
had to be deleted. Consequently, the ﬁnal scale comprised four
items: “Because Abraham/Ibrahim is the progenitor of both
Islam and Christianity, one can say that Muslims and Christians
belong to the same ‘family’ of religions,” “Christians as well as
Muslims believe in an Abrahamic religion,” “Even though Islam
and Christianity are different religions, both belong to the same
group of religions” and “Christianity and Islam have common
roots” (Christians: α= .88; Muslims: α = .86).Emotions Toward the Out-Group
A scale developed by Stephan, Ybarra, and Bachman
(1999) measured the participants’ emotions toward the
respective out-group (i.e., Muslims or Christians). On a
9-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely),
participants were asked to indicate the degree to which they
felt 12 different types of emotions toward members of the
religious out-group.
Exploratory factor analysis supported a two-factor
structure across the samples, where the ﬁrst factor repre-
sented negative and the second factor positive out-group
emotions. After deleting four items (i.e., admiration, accep-
tance, superiority and rejection) that had substantial cross-load-
ings (>.3), the factor structure was relatively equivalent across
the samples (Table 1). Consequently, two sum scores were
created: one comprising four negative out-group emotions
(i.e., hostility, dislike, disdain and hatred; Christians: α = .93;
Muslims: α = .91) and one comprising four positive out-group
emotions (i.e., affection, approval, sympathy and warmth;
Christians: α= .88; Muslims: α = .85).Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Stereotypes Toward the Out-Group
An index developed by Stephan and Stephan (1996) was used
to assess the participants’ stereotypes toward the respective
out-group. In the ﬁrst step, participants had to indicate how
many percent of the out-group they perceived as possessing
12 different types of traits. Next, participants were asked to
evaluate the degree to which they found it favorable for a per-
son to possess the different traits on a 9-point scale ranging
from 1 (very bad) to 9 (very good). Finally, to construct index
items that take into account both the perceived favorability and
the prevalence of the trait among the out-group, we multiplied
each percentage item with the respective valence item.
After deleting two of these index items (i.e., clannish and
proud), factor analysis supported a two-factor solution, which
showed acceptable structural equivalence across the samples
(Table 1). The ﬁrst factor represented negative stereotypes
(i.e., ignorant, aggressive, undisciplined, unintelligent and
dishonest; Christians: α= .83; Muslims: α= .64), whereas the
second factor represented positive stereotypes (i.e., respectful,
hardworking, friendly, reliable and clean; Christians: α= .87;
Muslims: α = .80).
Results
Test for Differences in the Means of the Main Study Variables
Muslim participants (M = 4.35, SD = 1.32) on average scored
signiﬁcantly higher on religious fundamentalism than did
Christian participants (M = 3.71, SD = 1.38; see the note of
Table 2 for all effect sizes of intersample comparisons).
Muslim participants also expressed a higher dual Abrahamic
categorization (M=4.47, SD=1.28) than their Christian counter-
parts (M=3.91, SD=1.44), supporting earlier research showing
that, in particular, minority members endorse dual identity cate-
gorizations (e.g., Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson, & Casas, 2007).
Christians showed more negative and less positive out-group
emotions (negative out-group emotions: M=3.11, SD=2.45;
positive out-group emotions: M=4.52, SD=2.05) than Muslim
participants (negative out-group emotions: M=2.44, SD=1.97;
positive out-group emotions: M=5.58, SD=1.94).
Among Muslims, differences in religious fundamentalism
and dual Abrahamic categorization were observed in terms
of education. Muslim participants with a university degree
(M=3.91, SD=1.50) scored lower on religious fundamentalism
than their peers who held a lower secondary school degree
(M=4.60, SD=1.14; F(2, 290) =5.92, p< .01, est η2 = .04).
Moreover, Muslim participants with upper secondary school
(M=4.70, SD=1.15) or university education (M=4.76, SD=
1.26) expressed a higher dual Abrahamic categorization than
their peers with lower secondary education (M=4.07, SD=1.32;
F(2, 290) = 9.52, p< .001, est η2 = .06). In contrast, no
differences between dual Abrahamic categorization and religious
fundamentalism were observed for education among Christians.
Structural Equation Model
In terms of our general analytical strategy, we tested the hypo-
thetical model (Figure 1) using multigroup structural equation
modeling (SEM). Because chi-square difference tests areEur. J. Soc. Psychol. (2014)
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Jonas R. Kunst et al.susceptible to sample size, model ﬁt was additionally
assessed using root mean square error of approximation
(RMSEA), comparative ﬁt index (CFI) and standardized root
mean square residual (sRMR). In terms of mediation, we
applied the mediation requirements proposed by Hayes
(2009), which have become widely accepted and more
common than the conservative requirements initially
proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986; see Rucker, Preacher,
Tormala, & Petty, 2011 for a discussion). Here, we used
bootstrapping with a sample of 5000 and conﬁdence interval
of .95 to test for mediation.
Speciﬁcally, the analytic procedure involved the following
steps: First, a constrained version of the hypothetical model
was estimated to give initial information about the adequacy
of the model across both study groups. To test for mediation
in the next step, direct paths from religious fundamentalism
and religious identity to the bias measures were added. This
allowed an estimation of the extent of the mediation (i.e.,
whether the relations were fully or partly mediated by dual
Abrahamic categorization) when bootstrapping the indirect
effects while also controlling for religious identity. Last, to
identify a ﬁnal model that optimally ﬁtted the data, constraints
in the hypothetical model were reduced path by path, testing
systematically for chi-square differences and using modiﬁcation
indices to add paths that could improve the model.
Results supported the ﬁt of the initial model1 with structural
weights and covariances constrained, sRMR= .083, CFI = .970,
RMSEA= .050. The chi-squared test was signiﬁcant, χ2(25,
534) = 58.69, p< .001, which is not unusual in estimations with
large samples (Tanaka, 1987). As expected, both in terms of
correlations (Table 2) and coefﬁcients in the model (Figure 2),
religious fundamentalism was signiﬁcantly and negatively
related to dual Abrahamic categorization, which supported the
ﬁrst hypothesis. Dual Abrahamic categorization, in turn, was
related to less negative and more positive out-group bias on all
out-group measures, also giving clear support for the second
hypothesis (Figure 2). Given these relations, the basic require-
ments for mediation were fulﬁlled (Hayes, 2009). Hence, we
set out to test the full mediational chain, testing whether
religious fundamentalism had signiﬁcant indirect effects on
the bias measures that were mediated by dual Abrahamic
categorization. Here, we estimated a model in which direct
paths between religious fundamentalism and the out-group
measures were added and direct relations between religious
identity and the out-group measures were controlled for. In
the model, χ2(17, 534) = 41.24, p = .001, sRMR= .065, CFI =
1.00, RMSEA= .060, no signiﬁcant direct effects of religious
fundamentalism on the out-group measures were observed
(.253< ps< .777), whereas bootstrapping showed that all of
the indirect effects between religious fundamentalism and
the group bias measures were highly signiﬁcant.
Speciﬁcally, religious fundamentalism signiﬁcantly and1The model was tested also with a dual Abrahamic identity composite
containing all items, including those which were deleted to achieve structural
equivalence. Despite trivial changes in the strength of the coefﬁcients, the re-
lations remained the same.
Importantly, both the hypothetical and ﬁttedmodel clearly outperformed the ﬁt of
an alternative mediation model, where dual Abrahamic identity predicts religious
fundamentalism, which, in turn, predicts the out-group measures. T
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Late Abrahamic reunionindirectly predicted lower levels of positive out-group stereo-
types (Christians: β =.15, p< .001; Muslims: β =.15, p
.001) and emotions (Christians: β =.15, p< .001; Muslims:
β=.15, p< .001), and higher levels of negative out-group ste-
reotypes (Christians: β= .10, p< .001; Muslims: β = .13, p
.001) and emotions (Christians: β = .12, p< .001; Muslims:
β= .14, p< .001). Hence, as all indirect effects but none of
the direct effects of religious fundamentalism reached signif-
icance, the results indicated full mediation.
Although our constrained hypothesized model demon-
strated close data ﬁt, stepwise releasing of the constraints
for each path showed that the hypothetical model could
be improved by removing the constraint on the path
between religious fundamentalism and dual Abrahamic
categorization, Δχ2 = 12.03, Δdf = 1, p< .001. Moreover,
modiﬁcation indices showed that the ﬁt of the model could
be improved by adding a constrained path between
religious identity and negative stereotypes, Δχ2 = 12.03,
Δdf = 1, p< .001, and unconstrained paths between the
religious identity measure and the remaining bias measures,
Δχ2 = 20.47, Δdf = 6, p = .002. No other modiﬁcations of
the hypothetical model were made. The ﬁtted model showed
a very good ﬁt to the data, χ2(17, 534) = 13.20, p= .723,
sRMR= .027, CFI = 1.00, with the lower boundary of the
RMSEA even indicating an exact ﬁt for the model, RMSEA
.001, 90% CI [.000, .047].
In the ﬁtted model, relations generally remained the same,
with the difference that religious identity now was related
to less bias in both groups but particularly among Christians.
Moreover, after removing the constraint of the relation
between religious fundamentalism and dual Abrahamic catego-
rization, religious fundamentalism was now most strongly
and negatively related to dual Abrahamic categorization among
Christians (Figure 3).Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Preliminary Discussion
The ﬁndings of Study 1 indicate that dual religious groups
have a substantial potential to reduce prejudice between
theologically related religious groups. However, irrespective
of religious faith, religious fundamentalists, who are known
for holding dogmatic worldviews (Hunsberger & Jackson,
2005;Wrench et al., 2006), seemed less willing to endorse such
superordinate ecumenical groups. Speciﬁcally, religious funda-
mentalism predicted lower levels of dual Abrahamic categori-
zation, which led to less negative and more positive out-group bias.
However, we presented religious identity before religious
fundamentalism and the out-group measures, assuming a role
for the religious identity construct early in the causal chain.
Consequently, religious identity was made salient to partici-
pants before answering all other questions, posing the empiri-
cal question whether our results would hold without such
salience of religious identity. On the one hand, this presenta-
tion order should satisfy the categorization saliency criteria
of Turner (1999) and arguably have led to more negative
out-group bias, which is in line with earlier research (Johnson,
Rowatt, & LaBouff, 2010), but in contrast to our actual results.
On the other hand, religious constructs have also been shown
to prime pro-sociality (Pichon, Boccato, & Saroglou, 2007).
Such an effect might, for instance, explain the unexpected
ﬁnding that religious identity predicted more positive out-
group attitudes in our unconstrained model. In the next study,
we address these issues in the sample in which the strongest
relationship between religious fundamentalism and dual catego-
rization was observed, namely Christians. We also use an
experimental manipulation of religious fundamentalism to further
conﬁrm that it does in fact cause dual Abrahamic categorizations,
as suggested by the superior ﬁt of our proposed mediation
model compared with a model that speciﬁes that religiousEur. J. Soc. Psychol. (2014)
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Figure 3. Fitted estimated multigroup structural equation model. Coefﬁcients displayed in the following order: Christian sample/Muslim
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Jonas R. Kunst et al.fundamentalism instead mediates the effect of dual Abrahamic
categorization on out-group bias.STUDY 2While several studies have established the negative causal link
between dual or common group categorizations and prejudice
(e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Gaertner et al., 1993; Gaertner
et al., 1996), this study experimentally tested the novel assump-
tion that individual difference variables—in this case, religious
fundamentalism—causally predict dual group categorization. In
other words, we set out to provide causal evidence for the ﬁrst
link of our hypothesized mediational model (Study 1). To avoid
confounding effects caused by religious identity that may have
been possible in Study 1 and, furthermore, to test whether our
results hold in the absence of religious identity saliency, we did
not present religious identity before the other measures this time.
Participants
In total, 80 Christians participated in the study. The majority
of participants were young adults (Mage = 23.63, SDage = 5.16),
male (63.0%) and indicated Germany (74.1%) or another
European state (18.4%) as their heritage country. In terms of reli-
gious traditions, 34.6% of the participants were Protestants,
30.9% Catholics and 34.6% followed another Christian tradition.
Procedure and Measures
Participants were recruited using the same procedure as in
Study 1 during February 2013. As manipulating a construct
that is deeply entrenched into individuals’ self-concepts,
such as religious fundamentalism, may be difﬁcult orCopyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.impossible, in this study, we simply varied the salience of
religious fundamentalism beliefs, using an order-manipulation
similar to earlier studies (e.g., Jost & Kay, 2005; Levin, 1996;
see also Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006; Shih, Pittinsky, &
Ambady, 1999). Such a manipulation activates and increases
the accessibility of psychological constructs and, given a causal
relationship, may have an effect on dependent variables
(Schwartz, Bless, Wänke, & Winkielman, 2003). In the present
study, participants were randomly assigned to a protrait condition
or a control group. In the protrait condition, respondents indicated
their agreement with the protrait religious fundamentalism items
(e.g., “To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to
the one, fundamentally true religion.”) on a 6-point Likert scale,
for which higher agreement represent higher religious fundamen-
talism. We expected this condition to increase the salience of
religious fundamentalism. In the control group, no religious funda-
mentalism items were presented in the beginning of the study, but
all were presented at the end. Next, we asked both groups to indi-
cate their agreement with the dual Abrahamic categorization
measure from Study 1 (α= .89), the out-group measures from
Study 1 (i.e., negative out-group emotions: α = .92; negative out-
group stereotypes: α= .76; positive out-group emotions: α = .88;
positive out-group stereotypes: α= .78) and a manipulation check
(i.e., the contrait religious fundamentalism items; α = .80).
Results
As predicted, participants assigned to the protrait condition
expressed a signiﬁcantly lower dual Abrahamic categorization
(M = 3.35, SD= 1.49) than their counterparts in the control
group (M= 4.06, SD = 1.38; t(79) = 2.24, p = .028, est
η2 = .06). Individuals in the experimental group also scored
lower (M = 2.78, SD = 1.43) on the manipulation check (i.e.,
the contrait religious fundamentalism items) than those in the
control group (M = 3.34, SD = 1.37), indicating anEur. J. Soc. Psychol. (2014)
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Figure 4. Estimated experimental mediation model. *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001
Late Abrahamic reunionexperimental assimilation effect in the protrait condition, albeit
a marginally signiﬁcant one (t(79) = 1.79, p = .077, est
η2 = .02). Hence, it is possible that the experimental manipula-
tion not only heightened the salience but even directly manip-
ulated participants’ degree of religious fundamentalism. No
signiﬁcant direct effects were observed for any of the out-
group measures (negative out-group emotions: t(78) =.29,
p= .770; negative out-group stereotypes: t(78) = .18, p= .858;
positive out-group emotions: t(78) = .04, p = .968; positive
out-group stereotypes: t(78) = .32, p = .752).
Next, we estimated the hypothetical model of Study 1 using
SEM, with the difference that the religious fundamentalism
variable was replaced by an experimental dummy variable
(1 = control, 2 = protrait condition). Again, the hypothesized
model obtained a good ﬁt to the data, χ2 = 0.97, p= .967;
sRMR= .027, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA< .001. In this model
(Figure 4), the protrait condition negatively predicted dual
Abrahamic categorization, which, in turn, was negatively re-
lated to negative out-group emotions and negative out-group
stereotypes and positively related to positive out-group stereo-
types and positive out-group emotions. Bootstrapping the
resulting indirect effects, the protrait condition had a signiﬁ-
cant indirect effect on positive out-group emotions (β =.09,
p< .05), positive out-group stereotypes (β =.08, p< .05)
and negative out-group feelings (β = .06, p< .05). Moreover,
it had a marginally signiﬁcant effect on negative out-group ste-
reotypes (β = .05, p = .055). In sum, experimentally manipulat-
ing religious fundamentalism caused congruent changes in
dual Abrahamic categorization, which again mediated the ef-
fects of religious fundamentalism on out-group bias because
it, as in Study 1, was related to less out-group bias.GENERAL DISCUSSIONThe present research supports the proposal that religious funda-
mentalism negatively predicts dual identiﬁcation, which, in turn,
leads to more positive and less negative out-group bias. SEM
with both cross-sectional and experimental data supported this
proposal, showing that dual Abrahamic categorization mediates
the effects of religious fundamentalism on out-group bias.
In his speech at a mosque in Damascus on 6 May 2001,
Pope John II highlighted the importance for Muslims and
Christians to “explore theological questions together” toCopyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.achieve a common understanding that will lead “to a new
way of presenting our two religions, not in opposition, as has
happened too often in the past, but in partnership for the
good of the human family.” As our studies highlight, acknowl-
edging religious communalities and the common Abrahamic
heritage indeed has the potential to shape attitudes between
Christians and Muslims in favorable ways.
To equal degrees, however, our studies indicate that religious
fundamentalism is an obstacle to achieve awareness of such a
dual group. Our studies showed that the individual-difference
variable religious fundamentalism crucially limits the positive
potential of dual Abrahamic categorization among Muslims
and Christians. It can nevertheless be argued that individual-
difference variables and social identity constructs may overlap.
One may not consider religious fundamentalism as a construct
separable from religious identity but, in fact, as a construct
representing an extreme form of religious identiﬁcation,
involving strong (i.e., fundamentalist) adherence to religious
group norms (Hogg, Adelman, & Blagg, 2010; Ysseldyk,
Matheson, & Anisman, 2010). In line with this, some authors
have argued that “intergroup tension (rather than individual
psychology) fuels fundamentalist attitudes” (Ysseldyk et al.,
2010, p. 65). Nevertheless, we included religious identity in
the ﬁrst study exactly to disentangle the effects of social identity
and the individual-difference variable. Here, results indicated
that it was religious fundamentalism, and not identiﬁcation, that
limited dual categorization.
More generally, although the CIIM’s potential for prejudice
reduction is well documented, there is a lack of studies
investigating re-categorization in terms of individual-difference
variables and the few studies that exist have solely treated the
latter variables as moderators (e.g., Esses et al., 2006; also see
Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 2008). As the studies presented
in this paper however show, individual-difference variables—in
this case, religious fundamentalism—may also function as
predictors of dual group categorizations early in the causal
chain. Future studies should further investigate whether other
individual-difference variables predict re-categorizations into
common or dual groups. Clearly, religious fundamentalism,
involving the belief that there is only one true path for believers
to follow, constitutes an individual-difference variable that is
particularly relevant to the dual religious group in the present
study. When dual groups, however, are deﬁned in terms of
ethnicity or nationality as mostly has been done in previous
studies, variables such as social dominance orientation (SidaniusEur. J. Soc. Psychol. (2014)
Jonas R. Kunst et al.& Pratto, 1999) and right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer,
1988) may play more of a role, as they are known for predicting
out-group bias in this context (e.g., Whitley, 1999).
Societal Implications
Despite striking similarities between religions such as Islam
and Christianity, “most people tend to ﬁxate on religious dif-
ferences rather than similarities” (Plante, 2009, p. 75). The
present study highlights the positive potential of being aware
of common theological origins for interreligious relations in
the West, and it also shows that this potential is critically
limited by religious fundamentalism.
Believers, who in addition to identifying with their
religious group agreed with belonging to the overarching
Abrahamic group, were substantially less prejudiced toward
the Abrahamic out-group. These encouraging results indicate
that the supra-ecumenical categorization was not perceived as
a threat to the distinctiveness of believers’ religious subgroup
identiﬁcation, which might have led to worse out-group atti-
tudes (see, e.g., Bianchi, Mummendey, Steffens, & Yzerbyt,
2010; Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Weber, 2003). In-
deed, more recent evidence shows that dual Abrahamic catego-
rization affects not only attitudinal but also behavioral forms of
bias as it leads believers to altruistic and real monetary
donations to members of Abrahamic out-groups in need (Kunst
& Thomsen, 2014).
Although dual categorization seems to contribute to more
harmonious interreligious relations, religious fundamentalism
emerged as a key obstacle to such dual group endorsement.
Being an individual-difference variable that regards core charac-
teristic of people’s faith, religious fundamentalism can be seen as
difﬁcult to change. Yet, the marginally signiﬁcant manipulation
check in Study 2 suggests that the construct has at least some
degree of ﬂexibility so that interventions may possibly change it.
Here, our ﬁrst study highlighted the potential of education, as it
was negatively related to religious fundamentalism and positively
related to dual Abrahamic categorization, at least amongMuslims.
It is possible that Muslim participants with higher formal
education had obtained more knowledge about the complex
intertwined relations between their own and others’ religious
traditions, which challenge the less complex views on religious
issues held by religious fundamentalists (Pancer et al., 1995).
However, education did not signiﬁcantly affect religious
fundamentalism among Christian participants. Nevertheless, it
was in this group that religious fundamentalism emerged as the
strongest predictor of dual group endorsement. On the one hand,
this ﬁnding challenges the bias of the public discourse in many
countries, where “the media have not scrupled to tar all Muslims
with the same fundamentalist brush” (Fekete, 2004, p. 23),
whereas self-declared Christian fundamentalists, such as Anders
Behring Breivik (the Norwegian mass murderer), seldom are
connected with fundamentalism (Rozbahani & Just, 2012). On
the other hand, it begs the question of how Christian religious
fundamentalist conceptions can be altered. Studies have shown
that threat perceptions contribute to majority members’ negative
attitudes toward Muslim minorities (e.g., González, Verkuyten,
Weesie, & Poppe, 2008; Schlueter & Scheepers, 2010) and can
lead to higher levels of fundamentalism (Salzman, 2008; Ysseldyk
et al., 2010). Reducing perceptions of symbolic threat mightCopyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.therefore be a way to diminish the breeding ground of religious fun-
damentalism among Christians, which eventually may lead to a
heightened awareness of Muslims’ and Christians’ common
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